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ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
ELECTION OF REMEDIES ON DEFAULT
SECTION 9-501 of the Uniform Commercial Code' provides that the
secured creditor can enforce his rights on default of the security agree-
ment by reducing his claim to judgment and that, if the collateral is
goods, the creditor may "do one or more of the following": foreclose
the security interest by judicial proceeding or take possession of the
collateral.2
In In the Matter of Adrian Research and Chemical Company,8 the
court was called upon to interpret section 9-50 to determine whether
the doctrine of election of remedies4 is applicable uider it.
On September io, 1957, the Adrian Research and Chemical Com-
pany executed a security agreement in favor of the petitioner in con-
sideration of certain rent arrearages. This security agreement, creating
,a mortgage on office fixtures and plant equipment, was duly recorded.'
Contemporaneously, the debtor executed a cognovit note in a sum equal
to the amount of rent arrearages, payable on demand, upon which judg-
ment was entered two days later. When the debtor subsequently de-
faulted in the payment of current rent, execution was issued on the
judgment and the sheriff, on March 12, 1958, levied on the collateral
and posted bills for sale. Shortly thereafter, on March 27, 1958, a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed by the debtor and a receiver
was appointed. The receiver immediately obtained an order restraining-
the sheriff's sale, whereupon the petitioner sought to recover possession
of the collateral. On these facts the court held that the secured creditor
could not take possession of collateral under a security agreement after
he had obtained a judgment, issued execution, and caused a levy to be
made.
'PA. STAT. tit. i2A (x954). 'PA. STAT. tit. i2A, § 9-5o (1954).
169 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. x958).
'"The doctrine stated in its simplest form means that, if a party has two inconsistent
existing remedies on his cause of action and makes choice of one, he is precluded from
thereafter pursuing the other." Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, x6 F.2d 589,
593 (8th Cir. 1926). See also, Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co., 107 Cal. 97, 29o Pac.
127 (1930); Hannigan v. Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America, 7 Del. i8o, 1S1 Ad. 4
(1935); Schmidt v. Johnston, 154 Md. 125, 14o AtI. 87 (1928); City of Kirkwood
v. Martin, 219 Mo. App. 490, 28a S.W. 542 (1926)i Johnson v. White, 171 Tenn.
536, zo6 S.W.zd 222 (1937).
'PA. STAT. tit. i±A, § 9-401 (954).
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In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that the creditor's
remedies upon default were cumulative, but it held that they must have
been consistent as well.' Since the judgment lien was invalid as against
the trustee in bankruptcy, having been perfected within four months of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,7 and since Pennsylvania recog-
nizes no judicial procedure by which a security interest in personal
property can be foreclosed,8 the petitioner's only alternative was to
acquire possession of the collateral. But the Pennsylvania court held
that the right to take possession was inconsistent with judgment, exe-
cution, and levy.9 That is,. the petitioner, by obtaining judgment and
execution, affirmed ownership in the Adrian Research and Chemical
Company, an affirmation repugnant to a claim of ownership in himself.10
When considering the doctrine of consistency of remedies of a se-
cured creditor, the jurisdictions of this country may profitably be divided
into two general categories: those which have enacted the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, and those which have not. Jurisdictions follow-
ing the Uniform Conditional Sales Act1 have generally held that re-
covery of collateral by a secured creditor is not inconsistent with an
' The doctrine of conclusive election of remedies does not apply where the available
remedies are cumulative and consistent. Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398 (1921)0
Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489 (1913); Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 126
Kan. 554, 268 Pac. 8xo (19z8)5 Washburn v. Peck, 245 Mich. 351, 222 N.W. 768
(1929); Rosacker v. Commercial State Bank, x91 Minn. 553, 254 N.W. 824 (934);
Nettles v. Sottile, 184 S.C. 1, x91 S.E. 796 0937).
"See ii U.S.C. § 107 (1938).
The problem of the instant case has been alleviated by a subsequent revision in the
official text of the Uniform Commercial Code made in 1957. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-501(5) provides: "When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment
the lien of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of any execution
based upon the judgment shall relate back to the date of the perfection of the security
interest in such collateral." This provision was incorporated by the Kentucky legisla-
ture when it adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. See, Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77,
Senate Bill No. 169.
a x69 F. Supp. at 359-
'Citing In re Fitzpatrick, i F.zd 445 (W.D. Pa. 1923); In re Elkins, 38 F. Supp.
250 (E.X. Pa. 194).
10 "To determine whether coexistent remedies are inconsistent, the relation of the
parties with reference to the right sought to be enforced as asserted by the pleadings
should be considered." American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56
Fla. 116, 122, 123, 47 So. 942, 944 (1908). 4ccord, Capital City Bank v. Hilson,
64 Fla. 2o6, 6o So. 189 (1912)i Nelson v. Jardine, 46 Idaho 82, 267 Pac. 447
(19±8); Scott v. McIntosh, 167 S.C. 372, x66 S.E. 345 (1932) Rowell v. Smith,
123 Wis. 510, 1o2 N.W. 1 (19o5).
" Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 2 U.L.A. (Supp.
1958).
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action for the debt until the debt is recovered. 2 In such a jurisdiction,
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code presumably would not
change the law, and a secured creditor could still claim possession of
the collateral after having brought an action for the debt at any time
before recovery of the debt.
A majority of those jurisdictions"3 which have not enacted the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act maintain that recovery of the collateral is
inconsistent with an action for the debt, and, therefore, that the election
of one remedy constitutes a waiver of the other.1 4  The effect of the
Code in such jurisdictions is more conjectpral. However, the use of
the words "in addition" in section 9-50i of the Uniform Commercial
Code would seem to imply that no election of remedy is made by the
creditor until he has obtained satisfaction of his judgment against the
debtor. Under such an interpretation of the Code, it seems likely that
most courts would construe the remedies of recovery of security and
action on the debt to be consistent, precluding operation of the election
of remedies doctrine. Thus, a secured creditor would be empowered
to recover the security notwithstanding commencement of a suit on the
debt, a result, it is submitted, which would be desirable. "
Also of bearing in" the instant question is section 9-202 of the Code,",
12 "It is dearly the contemplation of the Conditional Sales Law that the conditional
vendor may bring an action for the recovery of the price and later retake posses-
sion . . . ." Alls-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Nein, 64 S.D. 235, 238, a66 N.W. x56, x58
(936).
" See, e.g., Hollenberg Music Co. v. Barron, oo Ark. 403, 140 S.W. 582 (1911);
Boas v. Knewing, 175 Cal. 2z6, 165 Pac. 690 (1917); American Process Co. v.
Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942 (x908); Frisch v. Wells,
200 Mass. 429, 86 N.E. 775 (29o9) ; Norman v. Meeker, 92 Wash. 534, x58 Pac. 78
(i926).
A number of states, however, which have not enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act have held that an action on the debt and recovery of the collateral are not incon-
sistent remedies and apparently the trend of recent decision is toward this view. Cf.
Murray v. McDonald, 203 Iowa 418, 22 N.W. 711 (2927).
1, For typical reasoning, see Eilers Music House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 685,
156 Pac. 937, 938 (i926) : "In this state it is well settled that under a conditional sale
contract the title to the article sold remains in the vendor, and on breach of the contract
by the purchaser the seller has a choice of remedies. He may disaffirm the contract and
retake the chattel, or he may treat the transaction as an absolute sale and sue on the
contract. He cannot do both; these remedies are inconsistent. To proceed by one
remedy constitutes an election which is final and irrevocable."
1" The position of the secured creditor would be considerably improved in cases
where the judgment he has obtained proves uncollectible as in the case of a supervening
bankruptcy.
" PA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-zoz (1954): "Tide to Collateral Immaterial. Each
provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations'and remedies applies whether
title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."
[Vol. i959: 640
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which provides that title to collateral does not affect the rights, obliga-
tions, or remedies of the parties. It could be argued that this provision
was intended to extinguish the anachronistic notion that a levy of execu-
tion is inconsistent with an action on the debt.' The basis of this notion,
after all, is that a levy in execution affirms ownership of the collateral
in the debtor, and, consequently, that the creditor is precluded thereby
from later asserting title in himself by attempting to claim possession
of the collateral. Since section 9-2o2 abrogates nice distinctions turning
on the concept of title, it follows that enactment of the Code should
serve to displace the idea of inconsistency between levy in execution and
recovery of collateral. In this regard, the instant decision seems to
ignore a fundamental purpose of the Code.
It seems fair to assume, however, that future cases involving a simi-
lar question arising in other Code jurisdictions will be resolved differ-
ently and that the Uniform Commercial Code will be vindicated in its
effort to eliminate the technical distinctions of title and to strengthen the
position of the secured creditor with respect to his remedies against the
debtor upon default of the security agreement.
"' "But since this Article adopts neither a 'title' nor a 'lien' theory of security in-
terests . . . the granting or denying of, for example, petitions of reclamation in bank-
ruptcy proceedings should not under it be influenced by speculations as to whether the
secured party had 'title' to the collateral or 'merely a lien.'" Uniform Commercial
Code Comment, PA. STAT. tit. i2A, § 9-507 (1954).
